Abstract
I. Introduction
D u r in g re c e n t years, re g io n a l tr a d in g a g re e m e n ts (RT A s) have b lo s som ed. F rom 1990 to 1994, 33 such agreem ents have been notified to the GATT, w h ic h represents 30 percent of the total n u m b e r re po rted since 1947 (W T O [1995] ). T his surge in re gionalism interest has been accom panied by a de ep enin g and w id e ning o f ex isting agreem ents, in p a rtic u la r th e E uro pean U n ion (E U ).
T he resurgence of re gionalism has attracted m u c h attention fro m the eco nom ics profession. M o st studies concentrate on th e fo rm ation and expan sion o f trade blocs, and th e ir im pact on protection levels and on lib eraliza tio n , h ig h lig h tin g th e p o te n tially c o n flic tin g o bjectives and in flu e n c e s o f re g io n a lism versus m u ltila te r a lis m 〈 for a re cent survey, see B hagw ati and Panagariya [1996] ; Sager [1997] ; and W in te rs [1996] ).1 T he p o litical econom y aspects of re g ional integ ratio n are c ru cial to u n d e r stand trade stances adopted by trade blocs and th e ir influence on th e m u lti lateral system. In particular, the analysis o f the de m and for and the supply of p ro te c tio n in an RT A , ne g le cted in m o s t stu dies, deserves attentio n : Do
RTAs increase or decrease protection-seeking activities? N ote th a t th is issue is d iffe re n t, a lth o u g h re late d , to the s ta n d a rd q u e s tio n o n trad e blo cs: Do RTAs increase or decrease the level o f trade protection? (see fo r in stan ce
F ra n k e l, S te in a n d W ei [1996] ; H a lle tt an d B ra g a [1994] ; a n d K ru g m a n
[1993]).
T he po litical econom y approach focuses on th e pressures for trade pro tection (at the dom estic and regional level) and th e responsiveness o f the relevant trade authorities to these specific dem ands. T hree prin cip al factors can be identified: the free riding problem , anti-protectionist forces, and insti tutions. First, since th e size o f interest g ro u ps increased (as they can g et o rg a n iz e d at th e re g io n a l, an d n o t o n ly n a tio n a l, le v e l), free r id in g m ay affect th e ir behaviour. Hence: Can interest groups become politically more efficient in an RTA? Second, anti-protectionist forces are affected by re g io n al integ ratio n . T hen: Are protection-seeking groups more likely to overcome anti-protection resistance following an RTA? F inally, in s titu tio n a l chang e s r e s u ltin g fro m a r e g io n a l in te g r a tio n a lte r th e tra d e d e c is io n -m a k in g process. T herefore: Can institutional designs in a trade bloc increase the responsiveness o f trade authorities to protectionist demands? "Yes" is th e 1. So far, no consensus has em erged concerning the desirability of regionalism as a move toward global trade liberalization. answ er to these three questions. T he purpose o f th is paper is to address the first two questions, related to th e de m and for trade intervention, leaving the institu tio nal aspects of RTAs and th e ir influence on the supply side o f pro tection for another s tu d y 〈 see B ilal [1998] ).
T he discussion is organized as follow s. Section I I introduces the concept of the preference-dilution effect co m m o nly assum ed in studies on the p o liti cal econom y o f trade in the context of re g ional integration. T he free rid in g issue is addressed in Section III, w hile Section IV discusses lo b b y in g effi cien cy a t th e re g io n a l level. T hese se ctio n s sho w th a t in m an y c irc u m stances th e absolute p o litic a l in flu e n ce o f protection-seeking g ro u p s m ay increase as a result of a trade blo c form ation. Section V， focusing on anti-pro te c tio n fo rc e s , a rg u e s th a t relative p o litic a l in flu e n c e is w h a t m a tte rs .
R egional integration is lik e ly to strengthen the position of protection seek ers vis-a-vis th e ir opponents. T he m ain argum ents are sum m arized in Sec tio n V I.
II. The Preference-Dilution Effect
A co m m o n answ er to the question of how RTAs affect protection-seeking behaviours is th a t protectionist pressures decrease as a re sult of a re g ional integration. T he co nte ntio n is th a t interest gro u ps b e in g o rganized at the n ational level, the fo rm ation o f a trade bloc reduces th e ir relative size and th e re fo re th e ir in flu e n c e at th e re g io n a l level. D e M e lo , P an agariy a and R od rik [1993] refer to th is phe no m e no n as the "preference-dilution effecf. In th e ir words:
Irrespective o f the in s titu tio n a l setup，a re g io n a l a rr a n g e m e n t im p lie s a larg e r po litical co m m u n ity and hence a sm aller role in de te rm in in g policy for politically im p o rta n t gro u ps in each o f the countries. T his renders decision m ak in g less responsive to faction al interests, and m ay thereby enhance efficiency." (p. 177， emphasis added) . B esides, " (re g io n a l in te g ra tio n ) m od erate s th e n a tio n a l lo b b ie s ' d e m a n d s fo r in te rv e n tio n . T he re aso n is s im p le : each lo b by now has a sm aller im pact on decision m akin g, as the central in stitu tio n has to contend w ith n o t one b u t two groups clam o rin g fo r attention. Since th e m a rg in a l benefits o f lo b b y in g have gone dow n, the groups rationally choose to do less of it." (p. 180).2 N ational preferences m ay also be diluted for another reason. As the trad in g bloc becom es larger, interest groups can experience difficulties to orga n ize them selves at th e re g io n al level. To seek ex te rn al trade p ro te ctio n , national pressure groups m ay therefore choose to coordinate (or com bine) the ir effort w ith the ir counterparts (who share sim ilar interests) in partne r co un trie s. T h e free riding p ro b le m associated w ith th e la rg e r n u m b e r of g roups w ith sim ilar interests at the regional level m ay participate to th e preference-dilution effect experienced by national lobbies in trade blocs. Panagariya and Findlay [1996] offer a form al analysis of the free-riding prob le m in lo b by ing associated w ith an RTA, and in p articular a custom s u n io n , develop in g a M eade m odel w hich allows for trade policy to be determ ined endoge nously. T he free-riding com ponent of the preference-dilution effect is perfect ly consistent w ith the lo g ic of collective action, as described by O lso n [1965] .
T h is ty p e o f c o n s id e r a tio n b a s e d o n th e p re fe re n c e -d ilu tio n e ffe c t (a lth o u g h g en erally o nly im p licitly ) have le d eco n om ists lik e P an agariy a and F in dlay [1996] , R ichard so n [1994] , and S inclair and V ines [1994] to con clude th a t a custom s u n io n (CU) w ill te nd to be less protectio nist th a n a free trade area (FT A).3 T he arg u m e n t proceeds as follow s.
A ssu m in g th a t trade policy is fully endogenous, the level o f protection w ill depend on th e lo b b y in g activities o f pressure groups. In an FTA, w herein each m e m b e r c o u n try can set in d iv id u a lly its ow n trade po licy w ith n o n 2. A lth o ug h the form al m odel developed b y de M elo et al. [1993] is inspired by the credibility analysis in m acroeconom ics, th e ir conclusion is consistent w ith som e of the standard m odels of the political econom y of trade literature (see M agee, Brock and Y oun g [1989] ). 3. A n alternative line of argum ent is provided by K rueger [1995] w ho pursues a differ ent approach (to reach sim ilar conclusions). In short, she m ost convincingly argues that a FTA exhibits m ore potential for trade diversion than a CU (m ainly because of its associated rules of origins; see K rueger [1993] , and K rishna and K rueger [1995] , for a discussion〉 , w ithout offering any opportunity for trade creation n o t achievable under a CU. Trade creation norm ally incites opposition from dom estic import-com p e ting industries. B u t partner country's firm s w h ich be ne fit from trade diversion re sulting from the preferential trade area (by exporting goods from one m em ber country to another) w ill also oppose further g lobal trade liberalization. Hence, since trade diversion tends to raise the dom estic opposition for further trade liberalization, a FTA is more likely to nourish protectionist interests than a CU. m em be r countries, dom estic interest groups need only to lo b by th e ir own g overnm ent to influence the non-FTA level o f protection. T herefore, in an FTA protection has the characteristics o f a private good. In a C U , however, the ex ternal trade policy b e in g com m on to all m em ber countries, dom estic pressure groups have to exercise th e ir influence at the u n io n level as w ell.
T hus, at the u n io n level protection becom es a p u b lic g o o d subject to the free-riding problem . M oreover, the regional decision-m aking body is lik e ly to be less favorable to country-specific lo b b y in g th an nation al au tho rities, since it h as to balance (poten tially c o n flictin g ) specific interest de m ands from C U m em bers. In consequence, som e degree o f co o rdin atio n am o n g national interest groups m ay be required in order for lo b b y in g activities to affect ex ternal trade policies. T he reduction in national lo b b y in g influence at the u n io n level and the increased free rid in g problem re sulting from com m o n lo b b y in g activities re p re se n t tw o aspects o f th e preference-dilution effect associated w ith a C U b u t no t present in an FTA.
A t first, th is ex planation seem s co n v in cin g . A ctually, it m ay accurately describe the re g ional integration outcom e, at least in som e cases. However, this a rg u m ent relies on fo u r cru cial assum ptions. First, the free rid in g prob lem cannot be efficiently overcom e by protection-seekers. In fact, de M e lo et al, [1993] ju stify th e ir setting by m ak in g the assum ption o f non-cooperation by lobbies across countries. T hat is, interest g roups are unable to organize them selves at the regional le v e l〈 as in the analyses by R ichardso n [1994]; and S inclair and V ines [1994] ). Second, there is no effective counter lobby in g at the re g ion al level (i.e. ， lo b by ing against protection, for instance fro m the p a rt o f consum ers). T h ird , the fact th a t trade restrictions adopted by a C U affect a larg er n u m b e r o f people than national protection (phenom enon som etim es referred to as th e "contagion" effect) is disregarded. Finally, the "institu tio nal setup" does n o t m atter. T he first three assum ptions are exam ined in the follow ing sections.
III. Free Riding
T he free rid in g effect is a central issue in analyzing the im pact of RTAs on lo b by ing behaviour. By definition, the larg er the re g ional entity subject to a com m on (centralized) trade policy, the larg er the n u m b e r o f agents benefit-in g fro m trade policy.4 However, the larg er the potential size o f the interest group, the larger is the incentive, by each m e m b e r of the group, to free ride.
H ence, the low er is the chance of success by th e pressure group. In sum , for lo b by ing , sm all is better th an larg e.5
A. Olson's Logic of Collective Action
T his a rg u m e n t corresponds to a m echan ical application of The Logic of Collective Action as described by M a n c u r O ls o n [1965] . As the size o f the g ro u p increases, the cost of collective action (in th e sense o f a d o p tin g e ffic ie n t o rg a n iz a tio n s tru c tu re s w ith a p p ro p ria te in c e n tiv e s a n d c o n tro l m e c h a n is m s in s u r in g th e p a r tic ip a tio n o f g ro u p m em bers) rises. S im ultaneously, th e relative im po rtan ce o f each m em be r co ntrib u tio n for th e v iability o f the collective action falls. T h at is, th e free rid in g p rob le m increases w ith the size of the g ro up, as the pro b ab ility th a t the pu b lic good w ill be voluntarily provided depends less strongly on each in d iv id u a l co ntribu tio n. However, as th e n u m b e r of free riders rises, (1) the risk th a t the p u b lic g o od w ill not be provided at all increases, and (2) the b u rd e n on the active m em bers of the g ro u p increases.
4. The discussion focuses on trade policies b u t can easily be generalized to any redis tributive policy com m on to the whole region. 5. Pushed to the lim it, however, this argum e nt w ould tend to suggest th at pressure groups are m ore active in sm all countries than in large ones. Hence, ceteris paribus， the dem and for protection should be h ig h e r in sm all countries than in large ones, as protection-seeking in te re st group s can organ ize them selves m ore effectively. It seems that there exist no em pirical studies to directly test this hypothesis. E m pirical evidence indicates th at the level of protection (especially non-tariff barriers) tends to be h ig h e r in larger c o u n trie s 〈 see G odek [1986] , and M ansfield and B usch [1995] , for em pirical analyses; and Rogowski [1987] , for a discussion). However, th is general result, consistent w ith the optim um tariff argum ent, does not reflect the dem and for protection, b u t only the supply of trade restrictions. 6. The provision of public goods at stake in th is paper is (restrictive) trade policy.
Besides, w hen th e benefits from collective action diffe r am ong m em bers of the group, "there is a systematic tendency fo r the "exploitation" o f the great by the sm all" (O ls o n [1965], p. 29) . H ence, a h ig h variance in the distribu tio n of interest am on g g ro up m em bers increases the prob ability th a t the collec tive good w ill be provided, as it is the n m ore lik e ly th a t at least one m em ber of the g ro u p w ill fin d in h is interest to provide som e o f the pu b lic g o o d 〈 see also S tig le r [1974] ; M a r w ell and A m es [1979] ; and M ag ee et al. [1989] ). T his seem s especially p e rtin e n t in sm all groups.
T he a rg u m ent based on the variance of preferences in the g ro up is for m ally different fro m the one based on the size o f the group. However, the two concepts are lin k e d to the extent th a t no t only large groups are m ore subject to the free rid er prob le m (the size arg u m e nt), b u t they m ay also be ex posed to a g re a te r d iv e rs ity o f in te re s ts a m o n g m e m b e rs th a n s m a ll groups (the variance arg u m e nt). T he follow ing discussion w ill show, how ev er, th a t the lo g ic o f collective action can be challenged at b o th the theoreti cal and em pirical level (in sections III. B and III. C, respectively).
B. The Influence of Size Group Reconsidered
C ontrary to O lso n theory, several studies have show n th a t the provision of collective goods could as w ell increase w ith g ro u p size.
For instance, C h am b e rlin [1974] and M c G u ire [1974] [1974] em phasizes th e de te rm in in g role played by the non coopera tive process in collective action postulated by O lso n.7 7. A lth o ug h n ot m entioned by C h am be rlin [1974] , efficient cooperation in collective action could contribute to reduce, or even offset, the free rid in g problem threatening G e n e ra lizin g these results, Austen-Sm ith [1981] intro du ces u n ce rtain ty as a factor influ e n cing the ind ivid ual level of co ntrib u tio n to the provision of collective good. In particular, he shows that, for risk-averse ind ivid uals, (1) u n d e r specific co nd ition s,8 u ncertainty co nce rnin g the level of other g ro u p m em be rs' contribu tio ns increases the in d iv id u a l own,s co n trib u tio n to col lective action; and (2) Fon [1988] fin ds sim ilar results. Besides, E ichbe rg er and Kelsey [1996] show th a t (K n igh tian) u ncertainty can reduce free-riding in a large society, the sufficient cond ition b e in g the concavity o f either th e u tility fu nctio n or th e p ro d uctio n function of the pu b lic g o o d (rather th a n risk-aversion). To th e extent th a t lobbyists tend to seek protection to reduce the u ncertainty su rro u n d in g a regional integration process or th a t lo b b y in g activities ex hib
it decreasing re turn s to scale (at least over a certain ran g e), th e ir analysis w ould suggest th a t RTAs m ay contribute to reduce the free-rider prob le m of protection-seekers.
R ecent contribu tio ns in the rent-seeking literature also suggest th a t par ticipants in rent-seeking contests have incentives to voluntarily fo rm a competitive-share g ro u p (B a ik and S hogren [1995] ). M oreover, collective rentseeking increases w ith g ro up size, despite the existence of free rid in g (Riaz, S hogren, and Jo h n s o n [1995] ).
M o re generally, the conventional pred iction th a t collective goods are n o t lik e ly to be v oluntarily provided because o f the free rid er prob le m (particu larly im p o rta n t in large groups) has been challen g ed by m any authors. For instance, B ru b a k e r [1975] suggests th a t th e free rid in g hypothesis m ay be w eakened, even in large groups. H e presents th is w eak version o f free rid in g in opposition to the strong version d o m in a n t in the conventional litera large group activities. Besides, Pecorino [1996] argues that, usin g a sim ple trigger strategy, m aintaining cooperation m ay n ot be m ore difficult as the num ber of firm s in an industry rises.
8. Nam ely th at the m arginal probability of success in lobbying increases w ith lobbying efforts (i.e.，the level of contribution to collective action) from the group.
ture. T he strong version states th a t no p u b lic good w ill be provided, w hile the weak version asserts th a t free rid in g problem s w ill lead to an under-pro vision {i.e., below the Pareto-optimal level) of the pu b lic good (see also Fon [1988] ). A survey on the th e o ry o f v o lu n tary collective action is beyond the scope o f th is study. I t is s u ffic ie n t to no te th a t th e (stro n g ) free r id in g hypothesis has been questioned on theoretical g ro u nds. T he general con clusion e m e rg in g fro m these various approaches is th a t a collective g o od m ay be v oluntarily p r o v id e d 〈 for instance, see B ergstrom , B lum e, and Varian [1986] ; G uttm an [1991] ; and H irshleifer [1983] ). sis on strategic be haviour suggests th a t w hile som e degree o f non-cooperative be hav iou r is com m on, cooperative be haviour is also frequent. H ence, th e stro n g free r id in g h y p o th e sis seem s to be re je cte d. S im ilarly , in h is e m p iric a l a naly sis o n p e r c h u rc h m e m b e r c o n trib u tio n s , L ip fo rd [1995] rejects th e h y p o th e sis th a t th e free-rider p ro b le m increases w ith la rg e r groups.
C. Empirical Evidence on Free Riding
In sum , b o th at the theoretical and em pirical levels, som e doubts can be cast on the im p ortan ce o f the free rid e r problem , at least in its strong ver sion suggested by the O lson lo g ic o f collective action. It is argued th a t even large gro u ps experience only a w eak version o f free rid in g , suggesting th a t a size increase leads to an under-provision, b u t no t an absolute decline, of the provision of the p u b lic good.
IV. Lobbying Efficiency

A. Free Riding or Cooperation?
W ith regard to RTAs, free rid in g m ay appear as a likely outcom e. How ev er, there are m any instances w here free rid in g prob le m s m ay be overcom e.
A s the re g ional entity w idens, the various interest groups m ay fin d it desir able to o rg a n ize the m se lv e s. R e g io n a l in te g ra tio n te n d cies. For sm all firm s the incentive to free ride m ay in fact decrease, co ntrary to the p rediction fro m the preference-dilution effect, as they can no lo n ge r rely on the lo b b y in g efforts o f the few large firm s to o btain protection for th e in d u s tr y . O n c e in p la c e , th e s e tr a n s n a tio n a l p re s s u re g ro u p s m ay becom e m ore effective in shaping trade policies at the re g ional level than th e ir (less organized) counterparts were at the national level.
B. The Adding-Machine Model
A theoretical supp ort for th is k in d of arg u m ent can be found in the wellknow n "adding-m achine" m odel introduced by Caves [1976] . C ontrary to the 9. T his argum ent ignores, however, the institutional aspect of regional integration. The adding-machine m odel suggests th at the likely im pact of RTAs w ill be to increase the dem and for protection at the regional level, subject to the con dition that an ind ustry is no t concentrated in one country only, b u t dispersed th ro u g h o u t the re g ion .10 M oreover, an in d u stry too w eak to obtain political support in each country m em ber m ay choose to coordinate its efforts at the regional level in order to influence the centralized com m on authority.
C. The Demonstration Effect
Alternatively, one in d u s try m ay be w ell organized and influ en tial in one country, w hile re m a in in g powerless in others. In such a case, regional inte 
E. The Compensation Effect
RTAs m ay also, by th e ir m ere existence, enhance the dom estic dem and for protection. T he process of re g ional integration, by lib e ralizin g trade in th e in te rn a l m arket, b e ne fits som e in d u strie s, w h ile o bvio usly d a m a g in g 11. Unfortunately, the em pirical relevance of this argum ent has n ot been tested. A ctually, in a period o f adversity and econom ic distress, injured ind ustries te nd to seek pro te ctio n (and m ore g e n e rally g o v e rn m e n t su p p o rt) m ore fo rcefully th a n o the rw ise . increase. T his is often referred to as the "com pensation effect" (M age e et al. [1989] , ch. 11; see also B aldw in [1993] , for a discussio n).12
F. Influence of Group Size and Concentration on Lobbying: Empirical Evidence
It appears the im pact o f g ro up size and concentration on the co n trib u tio n to and success fro m collective action cann ot be determ ined at the the o re ti cal level as co nflicting factors com e into play. C onsequently, co nfirm atio n of the lo g ic o f collective action m u st rely on em pirical fin ding s. In this respect, two categories o f em pirical studies can be identified. T he first one relates to the re la tio n sh ip betw een concentration and the level o f po litical influ en ce (in term s o f activity a n d /o r success), w h ile the second set of studies focuses 1) C oncen tration a n d P o litic a l In flu e n c e T he m ain em pirical sup p o rt in favor of a positive correlation betw een the le v e l o f p o litic a l in flu e n c e a n d in d u s tr ia l c o n c e n tr a tio n is p ro v id e d by P ittm an [1976, 1977, 1988] indicate th a t ne ithe r firm size n o r in d u s try size have a ro b u st influence on p o litic a l activity or success. M oreover, g e o g rap h ical dispe rsio n increases b o th political activity and success, the latter to an even greater extent than the form er. T his re sult is partly supported by G rier et al. [1994] . In sh o rt, the em pirical literature on po litical co ntribu tio n does no t provide a clear conclusion re g ard ing the im pact o f concentration on the level o f con trib u tio n to p o litical cam paign. A possible explanation for these contradicto ry results has been provided by G rie r et al. [1991，1994] . T h e ir em pirical analyses suggest th a t the relation betw een in d u s try concentration and po liti cal activ ity can in fact be re p re se n te d by a concave q u a d ra tic fu n c tio n .
H ence, a regression betw een these two variables could show a positive or a negative relationship, depe ndin g on the range o f concentration ratio (i.e. ，o n the section of the concave curve). In a diffe re n t context, M esserlin [1989] suggests a sim ilar re lationship. M easu rin g the lo b b y in g pow er of industries protected by a n tid u m p in g duties in the E U , he noted th a t coalitions o f few firm s were the m ost "efficient" in o b tain in g protection.
2 ) S ize, C o n c e n tratio n , a n d Trade R e strictio n s w hereas large m em bers co uld experience a re inforcem e nt o f th e ir (protec tionist) preferences. T his conclusion stands in sharp contrast w ith the lo g ic o f collective actio n a la O ls o n and th e preference-dilution a rg u m e n t. As expressed by Rogow ski [1987, p.208] , the co m m o n b e lie f is th a t "insu latio n M arvel a n d Ray [1983] + _b P incus [1975] +? +? Ray [1981a] + + _b _b Ray [1981b] +b - achieved w ith large electoral districts" (see also A tlas et al. [1997] ).
To sum m arize, if the discrepancy in fin d in g s does n o t allow a rejection of the preference-dilution hypothesis, it suggests at least th a t th is a rg u m e n t sho uld n o t be applied in a "m echanical w ay" to the analysis of RTAs. T here exist no t only theoretical b u t also em pirical reasons to be cautious (if n o t suspicious) abo ut the relevance of the preference-dilution argum ent.
G. Further Considerations on Market Structure and Political Influence
T he th e o ry o f regulation, as developed by th e C hicago school (see Stigler M agee et al. [1989] ; M a n n and M c C o rm ic k [1980] ; and P ugel and W alte r T he incentive to pursue the adm inistrative path to protection w o u ld be fu rth e r enhanced if, as suggested by the preference-dilution arg u m e n t and the O lso n 's lo g ic of collective action, the po litical path to protection becam e less accessible to national protection-seekers (see B ilal [1998] ).
V. Anti-protection Forces
Ig n o r in g th e co n tro v e rsy s u r r o u n d in g th e O s lo n 's lo g ic o f co llectiv e action (i.e., the free rid er problem arises and cannot be overcom e), th is sec tion discusses th e im pact of RTAs on anti-protection lo b by ing . A ssum e th at trade p o licy is p u re ly e n d o g e n o u sly d e te rm in e d {i.e., solely by lo b b y in g activities) and that, follow ing an RTA, protection-seeking g ro u ps experience a "d ilu tio n " o f th e ir prefe re nce . T h e n , w h a t m a tte rs is th e relative，n o t absolute, efficiency in lo b b y in g (as em phasized by B ecker [1983] ). C onse quently, in o rd er to assess th e relative p o litic a l in flu e n c e o f p ro te ctio n ist interests, it is also necessary to consider th e influence of re g ion al integra tio n on anti-protectionist groups.
Indeed, RTAs result from a com prom ise betw een protectio nist and anti protectionist forces. Free trade support originates m ain ly fro m consum ers, in d u s tr ie s re ly in g on im p o r te d in p u ts , a n d th e e x p o r t sector, w h e re a s im port-com peting industries tend to actively sup p o rt restrictive trade prac tices. T hese antag o n istic interests influ en ce b o th th e process o f re g io n al integ ratio n and the external regional trade policy.
T he politics o f FTAs has been form ally discussed by G rossm an and Helpm an [1995] . T hey conclude th a t supp ort for an FTA is m ore lik e ly w hen (i)
trade diversion is h ig h and there is no (or a low level of) trade c r e a tio n 〈 see also K ru eg e r [1993， 1995] ) and (ii) w hen th e ind ustries m o st opposed to the re g io n a l in te g ra tio n can be ex cluded fro m th e ag re e m e n t, o r at le ast be granted lo n g periods o f adjustm ent. T h at is, as seen in th e previous section, However, the level o f ex ternal protection adopted by th e re g ion depends 13 . For instance, the agricultural sector is excluded from m ost of the FTAs (see Joslin g [1993] ).
n o t only on the dem and for "com pensation"14 fro m protectio nist interests, b u t also on th e pressure against trade restrictions from anti-protectionists.
It is lik e ly th a t the gainers fro m free trade w ill be m ore n u m ero u s than the losers. Typically, trade protection greatly benefits a sm all pro p o rtio n of econom ic agents (m ainly, som e im port-com peting sectors) w h ile h u r tin g th e m a jo rity (m a in ly c o n s u m e rs ). H ow ever, as th e costs o f p ro te c tio n , alth o u g h potentially significant, affect a large propo rtio n o f the population, they are d iffu se . H ence, th e ince ntiv e fo r anti-protectionist forces to g e t organized tends to be weak, since (1) Therefore, in absolute term s, the preference-dilution effect could w ell be larg er am ong anti-protectionist forces than am ong protection-seeking interests.
In other w ords, by incorporating anti-protectionist lo b by ing into the analy sis, it is possible to explain w hy protection could increase as the re su lt of regional integration, in spite of the potential grow ing free rider problem asso ciated w ith trade bloc form ation. Protection generates a few, generally large, "gainers" at the expense o f a great n u m b e r of usually sm all "losers". As the re g io n expands, th e fo rm e r te n d to experience relatively less free rid in g problem s and low er organizational difficulties than the latter. H ence, region al integration m ay lead to a relative increase in the influence o f protectionist groups. M oreover, to the extent th a t groups seeking specific protection are com posed o f relatively m ore ho m o g e n o u s m em bers th a n general-interest groups opposed to protection, it is likely th a t regional integration enhances the relative lo b by ing efficiency o f the form er com pared to the latter.
However, a m ajor exception arises w hen the level of protection so u g h t or
14. C o m p e n satio n fo r intra-regional free trad e in th e fo rm o f in cre ase d p ro te c tio n against im ports from countries outside the u n io n (see section IV. E).
obtained is sufficiently large to attract general pu b lic attention a n d /o r raise sufficient concern am ong anti-protection forces. Actually, if re g ion al integra tio n intensifies the visib ility o f (and th e sensitivity to) trade p o licy issues, and significantly dam ages the interests o f large g roups (such as consum ers) o r d o m in a n t sectors o f th e econom y, th e b e n e fits fro m anti-protectionist activities m ay becom e sig n ific a n t e n o u g h to overcom e th e larg e (m ain ly fixed) organizational costs due to free rid in g . In such a case, the free trader lo b by m ay becom e relatively m ore active and successful than the protection ist lobby in sh aping trade policies.15
In conclusion, alth o u g h protection-seekers m ay see th e ir absolute politi cal influence reduced follow ing a re g ion al tra d in g agreem ent, the re is no re a so n to ex p ect a re lative d ilu tio n o f th e ir p ro te c tio n is t p re fe re n ce s a priori. d e m and for p rotectio n, an issue often ne g le cted in the c u rre n t literature.
VI. Conclusion
T h e few s tu d ie s c o n ce rn e d w ith th is p ro b le m te n d to apply, in a ra th e r m echanical way, the concept of free rid in g or sim ply ignore the p o ssib ility of cooperation am on g interest groups o f diffe re n t countries in the trade bloc.
T h e ir general conclusion therefore suggests th a t regional integ ratio n entails a preference-dilution effect fo r p ro te c tio n is t interests. O n th e one h a n d , re g io n a l in te g ra tio n reduces the relative size o f natio n al pressure gro u ps w h ic h lose som e o f th e ir p o litical influ en ce. O n th e o the r h a n d , re g io n a l 15. By fear of free traders' reactions, protectionist interests attem pt to reduce the v isibili ty of, and the p ub lic awareness to, restrictive trade practices. For th is purpose, they have increasingly recourse to "low track" (adm inistered) protection such as anti dum p in g and countervailing duty r u le s 〈 see Finger, H all and Nelson [1982] ; and dis cussion in section IV. H ).
integration increases bo th the size and the n u m b e r of interest gro u ps at the re g ional level, w h ic h in tu rn becom e im paired by the free rid in g problem .
Consequently, the po litical clo u t of each pressure g ro u p d im inishe s, w hile trade au th o ritie s at th e re g io n al level becom e less responsive to specific interests.
T he purpose o f th is paper has been to contribute to this debate by offer in g a diffe re nt perspective on the analysis of the pressures for protection in the context of re g ional integration. Two principal factors have been id e n ti fied: the free rid in g problem and anti-protectionist forces. T he m ain conclu sions of th is study are the follow ing.
(1) C on trary to th e O lso n lo g ic of collective action, pressure g ro u p s m ay seek protection m ore actively in a re g ion al integ ratio n area w ith th e ir size increased (even th o u g h th e free rid in g p ro b le m increased) th a n p rior to the trade bloc form ation. (4) D e m a n d for (external) protection on the p a rt o f ind ustries (allegedly) ne g ativ ely affected by in te rn a l trade lib e ra liz a tio n m ay increase as a "com p ensation" for regional integration.
(5) T here is no system atic em pirical supp ort for:
(a) the free rid in g hypothesis (at least in its strong version), C o n c lu sio n s (1) to (6) suggest th a t protection-seeking g ro u p s m ay n o t experience an absolute d ilu tio n of th e ir preferences; w h ile c o n clu sio n (7) indicates th a t even if this were not the case (i.e. ， the fo rm e r conclusions d id n o t h o ld ) , p ro te c tio n is t interests are m o s t lik e ly to experience a relative reinforcem ent o f th e ir preferences (over anti-protectionist forces). Overall, th e analysis presented in th is paper suggests th at, a lth o u g h re g io n a lis m does n o t need to foster the dem and for ex ternal trade restrictions, it w ould be m isle a d in g to assum e th a t specific interest g ro u p s fav o rin g protection w ill autom atically experience a dilutio n of th e ir preferences in an RTA.
References
A m e lun g , T orsten [1989] , "T he D e te rm in an ts o f Protection in D ev elop in g C ountries: A n E xtended Interest-Group A pproach," Kyklos 42 (4); pp.
515-532.
A nd erso n, K ym , and R o b e rt E . B aldw in [1981] , 'T h e P o litical M a rk e t for Esty, D a n ie l C., and R ichard E. Caves [1983] , "M ark e t S tructure and Politi cal Influ en ce: N ew D a ta on P o litic a l E x p e n d itu re , A ctiv ity a n d S uc G rossm an, G ene M ., and E lh a n a n H e lp m an [1995] , 'T h e P olitics o f Free T rade A g re e m e n ts," A m erican Economic Review 85 (4 )， Septem ber;
pp. 667-690.
G uttm an, Jo e l M . [1991] , "V oluntary C ollective A ctio n," in H illm a n , A ry e L. 
